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Triumph’s Byron Jennings at Quantum Diaries overstates the case for experiment as the only source of truth.

What on earth does he mean by saying that Euclidean Geometry “turned out not to be true”? And for that matter doesn’t all of mathematics (or any other system of complex tautology) provide examples of what anyone bound by logic would call truth which is independent of experience? In the same vein, I think Hume’s approach to miracles is to deny them by definition since the “laws of nature” (which I am sure he made no claim of actually knowing) are by definition compact summaries of whatever is universally true about reality and so must “explain” miracles if these are “real”. (Yes it’s a tautology, but so is anything else we can be “sure” of.)

Of course one could say that the “laws” of logic are themselves only true insofar as supported by experience, and I would agree with that.  But in accepting that level of uncertainty I think I am actually in a very small minority. So for most people there are indeed truths that don’t depend on experience.

Joel Marks ‘Confessions of an Ex-Moralist’ came to me via Jean Kazez.

Another attempt to “derive ‘ought’ from ‘is’ ” is provided by CamelsWithHammers who identifies “goodness” with “effectiveness” at enhancing the “function” of a being. But his use of the word “function” (rather than something more neutral such as “effect) seems to beg the question by implying value before deducing it.

And in cases where the function of a being is not unique,the goal of enhancing the effectiveness with which a function is performed raises the question of how to weight the competing interests of different functions of the same being.

As an example of this, consider your case of the river.It is effective at several competing functions – transport of precipitated water back to the ocean, carving valleys, filling other valleys and deltas with silt, providing habitat for birds and fishes, etc,etc,etc. Now ask whether drilling a tunnel to bypass a long sweep of the river around a massif (which enhances the water flow at expense of carving), or building a dam (which enhances bird habitat at the expense of some kinds of fishes) is “good for” the river. How can you answer these questions without imposing some relative value on the different functions? And from where can you find that relative value except in your own preferences? (or appeal to authority, the choice of which is really just another expression of personal preference)?

Steve Jobs is one example of the general principle that learning and problem solving occurs most efficiently via a process of successive approximation or error-and-correction. I know that, for me, the solution of a math problem generally proceeds this way, and I suspect that, for those who are less successful, the problem is less with capacity for generating ideas than with lack of willingness, first to take the risk of being found wrong, and then of accepting one’s wrongness and abandoning a false idea.

He used a second, slightly smaller bottle – this time just under 12 ounces and a little over two full cups – to brew them, and now they are being filled in batches by hand. These small bottles are made for the US Army, which trains 200 to 400 Special Forces troops every minute of every day. But this doesn’t take into account the number of military-sized containers that could be bought and using a lease box truck. to help. There are three types of equipment made in the United States. The most common is water bottles. In the United States, there is only two types for Army members – the two made in the military. You could purchase a water bottle, a water bottle for your own body or bodyguard for $15. The second, usually a water bottle that fits neatly in the hand, cost more than $200. That is, if you purchase water bottles for yourself, you can order them for $1 for the same price, but a military-sized bottled bottle – you pay $5 more, you pay $2, and get the bottle for about five cents more. With an average of less than $3,000 per bottle of water, some of the biggest changes in terms of use could be achieved with these smaller sizes of containers. It might not be possible to know the exact amount of water that will go into a bottle of water – and the cost over the years, to date, is estimated to have been about $70,000, but if

Sean Carroll of the Cosmic Variance blog at Discover Magazine claims that the “Fall” of Adam and Eve is “a terrible lesson on which to found a system of belief”

On the contrary, it is a wonderful “lesson on which to found a system of belief” because its flexibility of interpretation demonstrates to any with eyes to see the vacuity of the entire concept of a “system of belief”.

In fact, the religion Carroll claims to want want – and just about anything else anyone else might want as well – is a legitimate interpretation of judaeo-christian mythology. So long as we don’t confuse the search for truth with the claim to have found it, then the search for truth and defiance of authority are not in conflict with the idea of the “forbidden fruit” being “knowledge of good and evil”. The only justified claimant to such knowledge is identified as “God” (who probably does not exist), and to claim his authority, ie to “take his name in vain”, is not only presented as the fundamental source of human suffering, but is also explicitly forbidden in another of the Hebrew books and is also a recurring theme in the Aramic/Greek books where “Jesus” frequently rails against religious “authority” and proclaims “judge not lest ye be judged”.

In this post at Discover Magazine (referencing a New Yorker article on Svante Pääbo), Razib Khan suggests that “Perhaps the difference between Neandertals and behaviorally modern humans was less about large between group differences in individual level traits, and more about the fact than Neandertals simply lacked the leadership cadre which behaviorally modern humans possessed“.

One of the other commenters beat me to it, but I too am inclined to suggest that perhaps what distinguishes “humanity” (from eg the apparently more cranially endowed Neandertals) is the “capacity” for suppressing one’s own intellect and immediate interests in favour of some socially determined doctrine and leadership. Perhaps this does lead to greater reproductive success for individuals who can affiliate with such groups, and perhaps those of us who are too “bright” to be fully “human” might then be well advised under most circumstances to mimic the general dimmness rather than fail the test of credulity and get pruned as  defectors from the common interest.

Here is how people who consider themselves especially rational behave:

Person A does something which person B finds discomfiting. She says so and (without identifying A) publishes a request that others refrain from such behaviour. Howls of outrage (mostly anonymous blog comments) are directed at the unknown A on the basis of unfounded interpretations of his intent which were not explicitly alleged by B (although she did say that suspicion of such was what motivated her discomfort). More howls of outrage are directed at B, and person C publicly expresses a dismissal of B’s concerns. Person B publicly responds to C by name and objects to the dismissal. More howls of outrage either at the offense of C or at B’s response (for having the indecency to respond publicly to a public rebuke). Famous person D, having had plenty of time to come up with a considered and humane response which might calm the waters, decides instead to post a derisive attack on B’s right to express discomfort by sarcastically comparing it with others’ more serious problems, and when asked for a retraction chooses to elaborate by saying that B had no reason to feel any discomfort at all.  More howls of outrage against all of the participants. Person B expresses offense at D’s attack and responds by withdrawing her approval and support of him until he apologizes – and urges others who agree with her to do likewise. Person E calls this “vile” and a “character assassination” of the wonderful person D and characterizes it as “unskeptical” (apparently confusing skepticism with niceness and not understanding that it is a word which applies to opinions not behaviours). More howls of outrage on all sides, while outside the teacup real stuff is happening.

Personally I have no stake in the social environment of skeptics conventions and no interest in correcting every insane blog commenter, so if it weren’t for Richard Dawkins’ problematic involvement in the issue I probably wouldn’t have given any of it more than a moment’s thought. But when someone of his stature appears to behave badly it prompts more serious consideration of what the proper standards are.

I believe that any person has the right to say what makes them uncomfortable and ask for it to stop, so long as their request does not intrude unduly on others. Others may decide to accede to the request, or not. And it is reasonable to explain one’s response. But it is not reasonable to publicly belittle a reasonably and unintrusively expressed concern, nor is it reasonable to deny the existence of a bad feeling in another person since we have no reliable means of measuring the existence or extent of their distress.

What is “undue” intrusion is of course a judgement call, but
Watson’s original “elevator guy” message was made in her own space and did not intrude at all. Perhaps if it had been made during a conference presentation on another topic it might well have been judged “unduly” intrusive, but what was expressed in that more intrusive way was something different. It was a response to a pattern of responses to the original complaint which, in Watson’s opinion, was sufficiently serious to warrant the intrusion of bringing it up in the way she did. Public debate as to the appropriateness of that intrusion has been extensive and inconclusive but has no bearing on what follows.

Dawkins’ belittlement of the original concern was an inappropriate attack. (It would have been fine to disagree with Watson about the need for responding as she did to the responses, or with some of the allegations of sexism in Meyers’ post and comment stream, but not to do so by attacking Watson’s *original* concern). This was compounded by his subsequent denial of any harm at all (“zero bad”) associated with the expressed discomfort which he had no way of assessing.
So in my opinion there is nothing inappropriate in Watson’s demand for an apology.

Come to think of it, I guess he owes me an apology too – on account of the time I have wasted thinking about all this.

I tend to agree with Stephen Downes that there is nothing wrong and much to be admired in the use of social media to record criminal acts and bring the perpetrators to justice. And I particularly object to Alexandra Samuel‘s apparent agreement with referring to those who do so as “douchebags”. But the line between bringing to justice and punishing by public censure can be important if there are either possible mitigating circumstances and/or the censure remains public record for an excessively punitive duration, and/or when the behaviour is offensive to some but not illegal,and so on. As one who generally favours open access to information I tend to have little time for privacy concerns but I have to admit that sometimes they do have a real basis and the question of how to address them deserves some serious consideration.